Colonel (Ret.) Philip Lisagor argues that the provocative terrorist violence used by ISIS in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere should not distract us from other political violence nor be the deciding factor on if, when, and where the U.S. decides to act.

Colonel (Ret.) Philip Lisagor on why the Powell Doctrine--real and imagined--is not a magic formula for solving America's strategic decisions when it comes to the use of military force.

Colonel (Ret.) Philip Lisagor argues that America's leaders and intelligence community missed the inevitable rise of ISIS because of organizational drift to from a 'gatherer' to a 'hunter' culture and a focus on 'actionable intelligence' to the detriment of analysis.

Colonel (Ret.) Philip Lisigor argues the exponential expansion of the Department of Defense, its corporatization, and embrace of management over warrior culture have contributed to a decline of the State Department and its inability to articulate foreign policy.

Colonel (Ret.) Philip Lisagor explores classic war and strategy literature and more recent COIN offerings in an attempt to explain the course of America's 'War on Terror.'